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Abstract
This paper explores the logic of scal restraints in a political agency
model with both moral hazard and adverse selection. The role of the
political process is both to discipline incumbents who may act against
the public interest and to sort in those politicians who are most likely
act in votersinterests. We use the model to examine the optimality of
ine¢ cient taxation, limits on the size of government, increasing trans-
parency, and yardstick competition. Some conclusions are surprising.
For example, we show that some forms of scal restraint can only be
desirable when incumbents are su¢ ciently likely to be benevolent.
We are grateful to Jim Hines and a number of seminar participants for insightful
comments.
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1 Introduction
There are two important normative traditions in modern public nance the-
ory. On one side is the Pigouvian tradition which looks at the structure of
government from the perspective of a benevolent social planner.1 On the
other is the Public Choice tradition, especially the work of James Buchanan,
in which the optimal scope and structure of government is derived on the
assumption that government is populated by rationally self-interested actors
who may use the state to further their private ends.2 A dening di¤er-
ence between these traditions can be seen in their attitude towards e¢ cient
taxation. The Pigouvian tradition unambiguously applauds e¢ cient taxes.
However, the Public Choice tradition is more circumspect, even suggesting
that strategic ine¢ ciencies in revenue collection can raise welfare by acting
as a restraint on government.
This paper explores the logic of this argument in a political agency model
with both moral hazard and adverse selection. From this perspective, the
political process serves both to discipline incumbents who may act against
the public interest and to sort in those politicians who are most likely act in
this way.
The model generates some surprising insights about the optimality of
restraints on government. For example, ine¢ cient taxation is never optimal
for voters when most politicians act solely for private gain; su¢ ciently many
Pigouvian politicians are required for the conclusions of the Public Choice
school to survive in our model.
The logic of our argument can be seen in the following example. Consider
a world in which politicians may be either corrupt or honest, and corrupt
o¢ ceholders can escape detection and remain in o¢ ce, as long as their corrupt
activities are not too egregious. Suppose then that auditing technologies in
government improved to the point that all corruption could be detected
and revealed to voters, but not until after the fact. If corrupt politicians
are indeed motivated only by private gain, their rational response must be
1In fact Pigou recognized the potential failings of the state. He notes that (i)t is
not su¢ cient to contrast the imperfect adjustments of unfettered enterprise with the best
adjustment that economists in their studies can imagine. For we cannot expect that any
State authority will attain, or will even whole-heartedly seek, that ideal. Such authorities
are liable alike to ignorance, to sectional pressure and to personal corruption by private
interest. Pigou (1920, p. 296).
2See, for example, Buchanan (1967, 1989).
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to increase rent extraction before leaving o¢ ce. Thus corruption among
rst-term incumbents would inevitably rise, but fewer corrupt politicians
would remain in o¢ ce, leading to an ambiguous e¤ect on the average level
of corruption.
Having established the trade-o¤ between discipline and selection in the
case of ine¢ cient taxation, we then use the model to explore a variety of other
measures aimed at restraining government, namely greater transparency in
decision making, yardstick competition, and limits on the size of government.
From analysis of these various institutions, a general way of thinking about
the issues emerges. The e¤ects of scal restraints can be decomposed into
two key elements direct consequences of the constraints faced by incumbent
politicians and indirect consequences via changes in the political equilibrium.
The direct e¤ects tend to be straightforward. However, the indirect e¤ects
are more surprising and drive the conclusions. But since the reason that
these restraints are being considered in the rst place are failures in the
political process, they are also the part that merits attention.
More generally, the results can be seen as a political theory of the second
best also emphasized by Fischer and Summers (1989). Agency problems in
government are only partially resolved by having open elections. Since resid-
ual problems remain, a further distortion in the form of ine¢ cient taxation
can be welfare enhancing, or it may simply exacerbate existing problems in
the political system.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two provides
some background on the literature and elaborates on the key ideas. Section
three introduces the model. It characterizes equilibrium and establishes that,
due to the commitment problem facing voters, improvements in votersinfor-
mation may in some circumstances lead to increases in rent extraction and
lower welfare. It also shows how voter welfare can be thought of in terms of
selection and discipline e¤ects. Section four uses the model to examine the
e¤ect of increasing the marginal cost of public funds. Section ve extends the
model to study tax limits, transparency, and yardstick competition. Section
six concludes.
2 Background
Our political model is a version of the political agency models introduced
by Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986), recently reviewed in Besley (2003).
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This approach captures the idea that the quality of government hinges on
the ability of voters to deal with the principal agent problem that they face
vis a vis public o¢ cials. Moreover, it is an approach which allows the Pigou-
vian model and the Public Choice models of government to be represented
as limiting cases. In addition to their theoretical attractions, the central
predictions of these models have received support from empirical analysis of
political decision-making and voter behavior. For example, Peltzman (1992)
found that voters respond negatively to spending increases at the state and
federal levels in the U.S. Besley and Case (1995a) showed that voters in guber-
natorial elections evaluate incumbent performance in a rather sophisticated
manner: the electoral consequence of a tax increase in one state depends on
scal performance in neighboring states. Besley and Case (1995b) in turn
provide evidence on how accountability in government responds to electoral
incentives. They nd that governors who face binding term limits choose tax
and expenditure policies that di¤er from those who do not.
This paper is related to previous work linking e¢ cient taxation and pol-
icy outcomes. In one important contribution, Becker and Mulligan (1998)
consider how changing the e¢ ciency of the tax system alters the resources
devoted to political inuence. If greater deadweight cost in the tax system
leads to reductions in inuence activities that more than o¤set the direct
costs to taxpayers then it can be good from a societal point of view. Krusell,
Quadrini and Rios-Rull (1996) argue that income taxation can be attractive
relative to consumption taxation even when the latter has less deadweight
loss since it leads to a lower level of transfer activity in equilibrium. Our
political model di¤ers from those employed in previous papers on this issue.
One virtue of our approach is showing how the case for e¢ cient taxation
depends on whether the political system is closer to the Pigouvian or Public
Choice world.
Whether to introduce formal limits on the size of government is a staple
issue of the public choice literature. The case for this has been made
forcefully by Brennan and Buchanan (1980). However, they study the issue
using the Leviathan model in which governments seek to maximize the size
of the public sector and electoral pressures serve no role in curbing behavior.
A number of U.S. states have adopted measures which curb the growth of
government by limiting taxes (see Rueben (1997)). This is premised on some
weakness in the electoral process which prevents normal electoral channels
from e¤ectively representing voter interests.
The main ideas apply to thinking about the importance of transparency
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in government.3 Greater transparency can reduce the incentives for bad
politicians to try to convince voters that they are good since they are more
likely to be found out when pursuing such strategies. Thus, increased trans-
parency can actually lead to worse incumbent discipline. The ip side of
this is better selection, as bad politicians are more often found out. The
balance of these selection and incentive e¤ects determine whether greater
information provision is good for voters.4
The approach also casts light on debates about the value of competitive
governments. There are two main dimensions. First, we show that the
results on ine¢ cient taxation can be interpreted in light of concerns about
competition for mobile tax bases which raise the marginal cost of public
funds. Pigouvians see tax competition as a source of welfare-decreasing ex-
ternalities between governments, while the Public Choice tradition applauds
the possibility that competition of this form can restrain the use of govern-
ment as a private interest.5 Our model casts light on whether competition
that raises the marginal cost of public funds is desirable.6
3Transparency is one among a variety of budgetary institutions which have concerned
analysts  see Poterba and von Hagen (1999) for a variety of studies. Alt and Dreyer
Lassen (2003) demonstrates the empirical relevance of scal transparency in OECD coun-
tries.
4Prat (2002) and Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole (1999) also consider the value of
information in agency models without commitment. They also show that less information
for principals may be sometimes be better.
5In debates about the role of tax competition, the Leviathan model of government due
to Brennan and Buchanan (1980) has played a key role. This model is based on the
notion that government would seek to maximize the tax revenues extracted from its citi-
zens. Moreover, because citizens nd it di¢ cult to control the behavior of (self-interested)
o¢ cials, government spending and tax rates tend to exceed e¢ cient levels. By creating
downward pressure on tax rates, then, tax competition may supplement the limited con-
stitutional means available to taxpayers to constrain their political leaders. This argument
was further explored in Edwards and Keen (1996). Wilson (2000) provides an alternative
model in which competition can induce greater public spending to attract mobile capital
if the latter raises the productivity of capital located in a particular jurisdiction.
6Sorting out the welfare consequences of intergovernmental competition is of more than
academic interest. The received wisdom is that increased economic integration among
nations in recent years has increased the mobility of tax bases across national borders,
with tax competition among governments attempting to attract mobile tax bases
particularly capital income by lowering rates below e¢ cient levels. In response to this
OECD (1998) developed guidelines for eliminating harmful tax competitionamong mem-
ber nations. However, the report contained a dissenting appendix by the government of
Switzerland arguing that competition in tax matters . . . discourages governments from
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Our model also has implications for the value of inter-governmental yard-
stick competition, which was rst discussed in the context of governments
by Salmon (1987) and its empirical relevance established in Besley and Case
(1995a).7 Increasingly, public spending functions in a number of countries
are being decentralized to local governments and agencies. Decentralization
is motivated in part by a desire to generate performance comparisons among
decision-makers and so to enhance incentives for e¢ cient provision of public
services. Our analysis shows that whether such yardstick competition is wel-
fare improving also depends on how it a¤ects the balance of discipline and
selection e¤ects in government.
3 The model
Government and the economy. We study an agency model of elections
with two time periods; in each, the politician in o¢ ce makes decisions about
government spending. Between periods, there is an election in which a voter
chooses between the incumbent and a challenger. Specically, in each period,
the politician observes the unit cost  of providing a public good and then
unilaterally chooses the quantity of the good provided G and the amount of
rent diversion for private purposes, or waste,s. Total government spending
for the period (equal to tax collections) is then x = G+ s. The cost of the
public good is independently and identically distributed in each period, with
 2 fL;Hg; H > L, and Pr( = H) = q. The representative voter derives
utility from public goods, net of the cost of government spending. When
the politician provides public goods in the amount G and total spending is
x, the welfare of the voter is W (G; x) = G   C(x), where C is a strictly
convex, increasing function and  is an exogenous parameter that indexes
the marginal cost of public funds in a simple way.
Politicians may be one of two types, goodor bad. Thus we label the
politicians type by i 2 fb; gg. A good politician simply chooses G in each
period to maximize voter welfare, and places no value on rents diverted from
adopting conscatory scal regimes, which hamper entrepreneurial spirit and hurt the
economy, and it avoids alignment of tax burdens at the highest level. (p. 77) The re-
cent OECD stance has softened with initiatives aimed more at eliminating harmful tax
practicesthe stance on tax competition is more agnostic.
7The theory of yardstick competition is also studied in Bordignon et al (2001), Hindriks
and Belleamme (2001) and Bodenstein and Ursprung (2001).
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public spending. Given , therefore, the level of public goods provided by
the good politician is
G(; ) = argmaxG  C(G) (1)
We denote the associated level of spending by x = G(; ) and of voter
welfare by W g(; ). Evidently, G and W g are decreasing in .
In contrast, a bad politician behaves strategically, choosing policies to
maximize the expected, discounted sum of rents s1 + s2 extracted from
government, where  < 1 is a discount factor, and  is the probability of
re-election to second term. We assume that there is a maximal feasible
level of government tax collections; thus x 2 [0; X], where X  xL. The
determination of the re-election rule is discussed below.
Information and Timing. The types i 2 fg; bg of rst-period incumbent
and challenger are independent draws from an identical distribution with
Pr(i = g) = . The incumbent then observes the rst-period cost shock 
and chooses public goods provision G and rent diversion s. The voter then
observes G and government spending x prior to the election at the end of the
rst period. However, the types of incumbent and challenger, the unit cost
, and the level of rent diversion s are unobserved. In the second period, the
politician then in o¢ ce again chooses G and s given . There are no further
elections; thus even newly elected challengers are lame ducksin the second
period. In casting their votes in the election, therefore, the voter must make
an inference about the incumbents type based on observed performance and
compare it to prior beliefs about the type of the challenger.
In this framework, elections serve a role in selecting good incumbents for
re-election in the second period. Moreover, as we shall see, elections may
also provide incentives for bad rst-period incumbents to restrain waste in
government, in the hope of being mistaken for a good politician and being
re-elected to a second term. For two reasons, however, the equilibrium out-
comes depart from those associated with an optimal incentive contract for
politicians. First, feasible contracts are restricted they are conned to the
voters binary choice of re-election, rather than a general pay-for-performance
contract. Second, the voter faces a commitment problem they cast their
votes for re-election after rst-period spending decisions have been made.
It follows that the equilibrium re-election rule is chosen to select politicians
optimally ex post, but it will not provide the e¢ cient degree of ex ante in-
centives. If it were possible, the voter might wish to commit to a relatively
7
tough re-election rule that removed even fairly good incumbents from o¢ ce
pour encourager les autres. However, in this model, such a rule would not
be credible and would, therefore, have no impact on incentives.
3.1 Equilibrium
The foregoing structure denes a game of incomplete information between the
incumbent politician and the representative voter. We seek to characterize
perfect Bayesian equilibria of this game. As usual, the game is most easily
solved by applying a type of backward induction. In the second period, the
politician in o¢ ce faces no further possibility of electoral discipline. Thus
s2 = X for i = b (bad politicians take maximal rents) while s2 = 0 for i = g.
Given s2, the politician chooses G to maximize voter welfare.
Given that second-period strategies are identical for challenger and in-
cumbent, the sequentially rational voting rule for the voter is to re-elect the
incumbent if the posterior probability the incumbent is the good type exceeds
the prior probability  that the challenger is good. The voters posterior be-
liefs depend in turn on the equilibrium strategy of the rst-period incumbent.
Since the good type cares only about voter welfare in the current period, he
chooses (GH ; xH) with probability q and (G

L; xL) with probability 1  q. It
follows that, in any perfect Bayesian equilibrium, the voters posterior be-
liefs assign probability zero to the good type at any other information set
(G; x). To economize on notation, we therefore write posterior beliefs as a
function Pr(gjx) of rst-period spending alone. Of course, the voters beliefs
are not restricted by Bayesrule at nodes not reached in equilibrium. Since
the good types actions are pinned down by our preference assumption, we
impose the minimal restriction on out-of-equilibrium beliefs that Pr(gjx) = 0
if (G; x) 6= (G; x) for  2 fL;Hg. At any such information set, the voter
would elect the challenger in the second period.
Accordingly, we can conne attention to three possible strategies for
the bad incumbent, each associated with one of the three spending levels
(xL; xH ; X) that are observed with positive probability on the equilibrium
path. First, b might choose s1 = 0 or s1 = X. Since future rents are dis-
counted ( < 1), however, the latter strategy dominates the former.8 Thus
Pr(gjxL) = 1
8Regardless of true costs, s1 = 0 yields a payo¤ to the bad type of X if re-elected and
zero otherwise, while s1 = X pays (1 + )X if re-elected and X otherwise.
8
in any equilibrium, and the voter always re-elects when rst-period spending
is xL. Beliefs conditional on observing xH are more complicated. A bad
politician who faces low true costs may, instead of taking maximal rents,
choose to produce GH units of the public good and spend xH , diverting
s^()  (H   L)G(H;) to private rent consumption. This strategy allows
type (b; L) to poolwith type (g;H), and doing so may be desirable, if it
brings a positive probability of re-election. Accordingly, let
 = Pr(x = xH j = L; i = b)
denote the probability type (b; L) exercises restraint in this sense, and let
 denote the probability of re-election when the voter observes xH . The
posterior probability that spending xH was generated by a good politician is
Pr(gjxH) = q
q + (1  )(1  q)
A best response for the voter is to re-elect with positive probability ( > 0)
only if Pr(gjxH)   or, equivalently,   q=(1   q). If the inequality is
strict, then  = 1. Further, type (b; L) prefers to exercise restraint instead of
diverting maximal rents ( > 0), only if s^+X  X. When this inequality
is strict, then  = 1.
Collecting these observations, there are three possible equilibrium cong-
urations. First, equilibrium may be pooling, as type (b; L) chooses s1 = s^ and
so is indistinguishable from type (g;H). Second, equilibrium may be separat-
ing, as type (b; L) chooses s1 = X and is revealed ex post. Third, equilibrium
may be a hybrid one, in which type (b; L) adopts a strictly mixed strategy on
actions s1 = s^ and s1 = X, so that type is revealed with positive probability
strictly less than one. The following result fully characterizes the possible
congurations.
Lemma 1 An equilibrium exists for all values of parameters and is generi-
cally unique.
1. A pooling equilibrium, with  =  = 1, exists if and only if
q  1
2
& s^()  (1  )X (2)
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2. A hybrid equilibrium, with  = q=(1  q) and  = (X  s^)=(X), exists
if and only if
q <
1
2
& s^()  (1  )X (3)
3. A separating equilibrium, with  = 0 and  = 1, exists if and only if
s^()  (1  )X (4)
In the separating equilibrium, b takes maximal rents and is detected with cer-
tainty and replaced by the challenger. (This equilibrium outcome is therefore
equivalent to that which would obtain if voter could observe the cost shock
directly.) In the pooling and hybrid equilibria, the incumbent is taking less
than maximal rents and his type of revealed with lower probability.9 The
latter is most likely when s^() is high and the incumbent discounts the future
a great deal so that he prizes rents earned in period one.
This framework implies a somewhat more optimistic view of politics than
is standard in the Public Choice tradition  it allows for the existence of
public-spirited as well as venal politicians. Even a very small fraction of
good politicians can have a large e¤ect on equilibrium behavior with su¢ cient
discounting: if s^()  (1   )X, it becomes optimal for a bad politician
to mimic a good one to gain some chance of re-election. It is only when
both good and bad politicians are present in the population of candidates,
however, that the re-election incentive becomes credible, i.e., are part of the
equilibrium behavior of the electorate.
3.2 Selection and Incentives
To understand how the electoral process a¤ects political decision-making in
the model, it is useful to calculate expected voter welfare in equilibrium. As a
benchmark for the analysis, suppose that politicians are removed from o¢ ce
each period with certainty. Expected voter welfare when type g is in o¢ ce
would then be EW g = qW gH + (1   q)W gL, whereas welfare with b in o¢ ce
would simply be W b =  C(X), since lame-duckbad politicians divert
maximal rents. To simplify notation, let W 0() = EW g()+ (1 )W b()
9Note however that in the pooling equilibrium the outcome is similar to that assumed
in the Leviathan model of the Public Choice tradition, where rents are often assumed to
be positively related to the level of legitimatepublic spending.
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be the unconditional expected per-period welfare in this case. It follows that
the present value of expected welfare is just (1 + )W 0() when there is no
chance of re-election.
Equilibrium welfare in the equilibrium described in Lemma 1 can be writ-
ten as
EW (; ; ) = (1 + )W 0() + (1  )(1  q)D() + (2   )S() (5)
where:
D() =W g(H;) W b() (6)
S() = EW g() W b() (7)
and
2    = (1  )[q + (1  q)(1  )] (8)
Equation (5) has a simple interpretation, as the last two terms represent the
deviation from welfare in the absence of re-election possibilities. The term
D () is the discipline e¤ect induced by re-election possibilities the fact that
bad incumbents restrain rent seeking while S () represents selection the
fact that elections improve the quality of period two policy by weeding out
bad incumbents. Multiplying each e¤ect is the probability that the relevant
events occur and these benets of elections are reaped. With probability
(1   )(1   q), the rst-period incumbent chooses to produce GH of the
public good and divert rents s^ instead of X, resulting in the welfare gain
from discipline. The expression 2   is in turn the increased condence
that the period two incumbent is good.10
In summary, the possibility of re-electing incumbents can increase voter
welfare both by improving average quality of o¢ ce-holders (the selection ef-
fect) and by o¤ering prospective incentives for low-quality incumbents (the
discipline e¤ect). To understand the impact of changes in the scal regime,
the e¤ects on selection and incentives in elections must be understood. This
in turn requires understanding how equilibrium political behavior (as repre-
sented by  and ) is a¤ected.
10To interpret this expression, observe that the probability of Type I and Type II errors
in voters re-election decision, given the equilibrium strategies, are given by
~(; )  Pr(re-electjb) = (1  q)
~(; )  Pr(do not re-electjg) = q(1  )
so that 2    = (1  )(1  ~  ~).
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4 The Case for Ine¢ cient Taxation
We now turn to the e¤ect of tax e¢ ciency on voter welfare. The compara-
tive static that we perform could be interpreted in one of four ways: (i) an
intensication of tax competition (ii) passage of a citizensinitiative which
restricts the use of a specic tax instrument (iii) passage of a constitutional
restriction which restricts the tax base (iv) technological change in the abil-
ity to collect taxes.11 In all four cases, we expect the cost of public funds to
change.
We now consider how an increase in the marginal cost of public funds
changes voter welfare. Specically, we consider an exogenous increase in the
parameter . Expected rent diversion is decreasing in  in the pooling and
hybrid equilibria, since s^() = (H L)G(H;) is decreasing in . By reduc-
ing the level of spending by benevolent governments, increasing ine¢ ciency
in the tax system restricts the amount of wasteful spending that can be un-
dertaken by self-interested o¢ cials without fear of detection. To determine
whether this e¤ect can exceed the usual welfare cost of tax competition, we
di¤erentiate (5) to obtain the following result.
Proposition 2 Increased ine¢ ciency in the tax system (as represented by
an increase in ) that leaves equilibrium strategies (; ) unchanged reduces
voter welfare, even if it reduces rent diversion by bad politicians.
This result holds in spite of the fact that increasing ine¢ ciency of the tax
system does (sometimes) lower rent extraction by bad incumbents. This fails
to deliver a benet to voters in any of the equilibria described in Lemma 1.
When the equilibrium is separating, rent seeking is maximal anyway and
voters would prefer to be robbede¢ ciently. Ine¢ ciency in the tax system
only increases the costs of venality. In pooling or hybrid equilibrium, tax
ine¢ ciency leads to reduced rent seeking. However, voters are worse o¤ as
the level of rent seeking is xed by the condition that the incumbent behaves
as if the high cost state has arisen. Ine¢ ciencies in the tax system that
raise the marginal cost of public funds only make the cost of funding public
spending in this state larger.
The key assumption in Proposition 1 is that equilibrium strategies remain
unchanged. However, this need not be so and, if it is not the case, there
11Peltzman (1980) argues that this has been important historically and in comparing
developed and developing countries.
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are two competing e¤ects to consider. First, the equilibrium can induce a
change in strategy that leads to more information about the incumbent being
revealed and, second, the rent extracted by politicians may change.
Returning to Lemma 1, it is clear that increasing ine¢ ciencies in the
tax system can lead to a move from a pooling or hybrid equilibrium to a
separating equilibrium. Specically, dening  from s^
 


= (1  )X,
then for all  > , there will be separation between the good and bad
incumbents. This occurs because equilibrium rents are proportional to the
size of government in the pooling or hybrid cases. As the size of government is
reduced by greater ine¢ ciency in the tax system, rent extraction possibilities
are limited, making it more likely that a bad incumbent will go for broke
and extract maximal rents. In this instance, all equilibrium information
(about  and the type of the politician) is revealed in equilibrium. Hence,
to ascertain the welfare e¤ects of tax competition which increases  above
, we need to compare full information welfare with that in the equilibrium
with  < .
Intuitively, the impact on voter welfare of a move to separation involves
a trade-o¤ between the short-run costs of reduced discipline, and the long-
run benets that result when bad politicians reveal type and are removed
from o¢ ce. Computing welfare for the two cases from (5) shows that the
selection e¤ect outweighs the discipline e¤ect, so that welfare is higher in the
separating equilibrium, if and only if S()  D(). Our main result on
the welfare e¤ect of tax ine¢ ciencies then follows:
Proposition 3 There exists a  > 0 such that increasing the ine¢ ciency
of the tax system (as represented by an increase in ) unambiguously reduces
voter welfare for all  < . For   , an increase in the ine¢ ciency of
the tax system which moves the equilibrium from hybrid or pooling to sepa-
rating may increase voter welfare if it induces a shift from a hybrid or pooling
equilibrium towards a separating equilibrium. Moreover  < 1 if  is su¢ -
ciently close to one.
This result says that an increase in the ine¢ ciency of the tax system
can enhance voter welfare only if it leads to an increase in the ability of
the voter to detect bad incumbents. This leads to some rather paradoxical
implications. First, a su¢ ciently large increase in the cost of public funds
may indeed increase equilibrium welfare, but only if the change increases
the amount of wasteful spending in the rst period. Voter welfare will
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be higher from improved selection when the fraction of good types in the
population  is su¢ ciently high. Furthermore, raising the marginal cost of
funds can increase voter welfare only when the political process is closer to
the benevolent government paradigm.
The political agency model used here has a pedigree in explaining patterns
of taxing and spending in U.S. state level data, and proposition 2 generates
further testable implications that link tax e¢ ciency, political turnover and
the size of government. First, the model predicts that increasing the mar-
ginal cost of public funds will increase political turnover as bad politicians
are less likely to pool with good ones. Second, the e¤ect on the size of
government is ambiguous. This depends on the fractions of good and bad
politicians in the data the negative direct e¤ect could be o¤set by a positive
political equilibrium e¤ect.
5 Other Restraints
The key to understanding whether it is ever optimal to use ine¢ cient taxation
rested on the balance of discipline and selection e¤ects. We now apply these
ideas to three further examples. For simplicity, we consider in this section
the case where q > 1=2. Lemma 1 now implies that only the separating
and pooling equilibria are relevant. Which one of them arises depends
only on whether exercising restraint is worthwhile for bad incumbents. The
equilibrium is pooling if s^ () > (1  )X and is separating otherwise.
5.1 Limiting the Power to Tax
Changing the marginal cost of public funds could be seen as a crude means of
restraining waste in government after all, it changes the behavior of good
and bad incumbents alike. Consider instead a constitutional restriction
on X, the maximum tax level that the government can levy. This has
the advantage of reducing the rent seeking that a bad politician does when
the state is  = H and hence improving voter welfare (assuming that the
limitation does not distort the behavior of good politicians). However, it
reduces both the discipline and selection e¤ects since bad politicians are
no longer as bad as they were previously. Overall, it is straightforward to
show that a tax limitation that leaves the behavior of the good politicians
unaltered and does not change the political equilibrium is welfare improving
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for the voter.
The more interesting case is where the tax limitation shifts the political
equilibrium.12 Lemma 1 makes clear why the e¤ect of lowering X is to
increase the incentive of incumbents to pool, and so to make the political
equilibrium less informative. This has the opposite e¤ect to that of increasing
, the marginal cost of public funds. This suggests that a tax limitation
will be attractive when selection is less important than discipline i.e., when
S () < D (). Thus, a tax limitation is more likely to be desirable when
there is a predominance of self-interested politicians when  is small. This
is more in line with the traditional Public Choice view.
Thus, we have:
Proposition 4 Suppose that a limit is imposed on the size of government
(as measured by X). Then there exists a ^ such that voter welfare increases
if  < ^.
This illustrates the subtle di¤erences between the welfare e¤ects of di¤er-
ent types of scal restraint. It also illustrates the importance of analyzing
the detailed e¤ect of political incentives in response to the imposition of
restraints.
5.2 Fiscal Transparency
We now consider the e¤ect on the political equilibrium of supplying better
information about government. This corresponds to an increase in scal
transparency in the budgetary process  the voter learns more of the in-
formation that lies behind taxing and spending decisions. It is commonly
thought that this will lead to an increase in voter welfare.
Suppose now that, after the incumbent has chosen s1 and before the
period one election is held, the voter may learn about the true cost of public
services . Specically, the true value of  is revealed with probability ;
otherwise, no signal is received by the voter. The result in Lemma 1 is now
modied. The payo¤when a bad politician pools with a good one is s^ ()+
(1  ) X while, if he chooses to reveal his type, it is X. Pooling is now
worthwhile if and only if s^ () > (1  (1  ) )X, a more stringent condition
than in the absence of an informative signal (see Lemma 1). Moreover,
12Here we consider only the case where the maximum spending level X remains high
enough to leave the behavior of good politicians unchanged.
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pooling is less likely to be optimal the closer is  to one. Indeed, if  = 1,
then the only possible period one equilibrium is separating.13
Better information therefore tends to reduce discipline and increase rst-
term rent seeking. At the same time, however, it improves selection, as
bad incumbents are less likely to survive re-election. By evaluating the
trade-o¤ between agency costs of rst-term and second-term incumbents, we
can assess whether such a change in the political equilibrium is worthwhile.
Since q > 1=2, the only comparison is between pooling ( = 1) and separation
( = 0). Evaluating welfare from (5) gives the di¤erence between separating
and pooling equilibrium welfare as
(1  )(1  q)(S () D ())
We can therefore summarize the e¤ects of transparency in the model by:
Proposition 5 Suppose that the voter receives an informative signal about
the cost of providing public goods. The signal improves voter welfare only if
the selection e¤ect of elections dominates the discipline e¤ect, i.e. S () 
D ().
The above expression reveals the determinants of this trade-o¤. The
selection e¤ect is larger, the better is the pool of incumbents ( close to one)
and the lower the level of discounting.
This result suggests that, in political agency models, more information
need not be desirable for voters. This is related to the broader theoretical lit-
erature on the value of information in agency relationships. In the standard
complete contracts model of Holmstrom (1979), more information is better.
Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole (1999) show that coarser information may
sometimes be better in motivating agents in a career concerns model where
incentives are implicit. This reects a kind of second-best reasoning with
incomplete incentives, an otherwise welfare improving change (more infor-
mation) may have deleterious e¤ects on equilibrium behavior that more than
o¤set the direct welfare impact. In our model, incentives are incomplete
since the threat of not being re-elected is the only mechanism with which the
voter may discipline incumbents.
13A similar argument can be made if we instead supposed that with some probablity
information about whether s1 is positive comes to light before the election.
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5.3 Yardstick Competition
Another aspect of competitive government is the use of comparisons as a
benchmark so-called yardstick competition.14 Besley and Case (1995b)
nd evidence for the relevance of this model in U.S. state level data. This
acts a scal restraint since the incumbent in one jurisdiction knows that he
will be compared with that in another. If there is a positive correlation in the
cost shocks, then this creates an informational externality. However, unlike
the pure transparency model, studying this requires a model of equilibrium
behavior generating information, i.e., equilibrium in both jurisdictions.
To extend the model to include yardstick comparisons, suppose now that
here are two identical jurisdictions, labeled domesticand foreign; vari-
ables that apply to the foreign jurisdiction will be denoted by the prime
symbol. To focus on symmetric equilibria of the game among incumbents
and voters in the two jurisdictions, assume that the joint probability distri-
bution function of cost shocks Pr(; 0) is symmetric, with
Pr(H;H) = Pr(L;L) =

2
Pr(H;L) = Pr(L;H) =
1  
2
(9)
Moreover, we work with the case where  > 1=2, so that cost shocks in the
two jurisdictions are positively correlated. To further simplify the analysis,
we assume that s^ > (1  )X, so that a separating equilibrium cannot exist.
Since the marginal p.d.f. has q = Pr( = H) = 1=2, it follows from Lemma
1 that the unique equilibrium of the game without yardstick competition is
one with pooling. We now show that, depending on the value of , both
hybrid and pooling equilibria are possible with yardstick competition.
When performance of foreign as well as domestic o¢ cials is observable,
voters may base their decision to re-elect the incumbent or not on relative
performance in the two jurisdictions. Voters will now condition their vot-
ing behavior on tax setting in both the domestic and foreign jurisdictions.
Accordingly, let the probability of re-election in the domestic jurisdiction be
(x; x0) when observed spending levels in the domestic and foreign jurisdic-
tions are x and x0 respectively. We say the voters strategy involves yardstick
14Holmstrom (1982) gives the classic treatment in an agency model. Meyer and Vick-
ers (1997) consider these issues in a model of regulation a context in which yardstick
competition is widely used.
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competition when re-election occurs with positive probability if spending is
high in both jurisdictions, but the probability of re-election is zero if do-
mestic spending is high and foreign spending is low. That is, a re-election
rule with yardstick competition has (xH ; xH) =  for some  > 0 and
(xH ; xL) = 0.15
As before, let  denote the probability type (b; L) chooses s1 = s^. Since
we look for an equilibrium in which the strategies adopted by domestic and
foreign incumbents are symmetric ( = 0), the p.d.f. Pr(x; x0ji) of domestic
and foreign spending conditional on type of the domestic politician can be
calculated as
Pr(xH ; xH jg) = 
2
+ (1  )1  
2
Pr(xH ; xH jb) = 1  
2
+ (1  )2
2
(10)
(There are two terms in each probability because x0 = xH might have been
generated by a good foreign politician facing high costs or a bad foreign
politician facing low costs.) Votersposterior beliefs about the incumbent
can therefore be calculated from Bayesrule:
Pr(gjxH ; xH) = 
 + (1  ) `(; ; ) (11)
(12)
`(; ; ) =
Pr(xH ; xH jb)
Pr(xH ; xH jg)
where `(; ; ) is the likelihood ratio that (xH ; xH) was generated by a bad
rather than good incumbent. Key to understanding the logic of the ensuing
results in the fact that ` () is a decreasing function of   the worse the
initial reputation of the incumbent, the more likely it is that (xH ; xH) was
generated by a bad incumbent. This is because, at low , (xH ; xH) is more
likely generated by a foreign bad incumbent with cost of L than a foreign
good incumbent with a cost of H. But with positive correlation in costs, it
is also more likely that the cost at home is L and hence that the domestic
incumbent is bad.
A necessary and su¢ cient condition for an equilibrium with yardstick
competition to exist is that Pr(gjxH ; xL) < , so that the voter prefers to
15Of course, (xL; x0) = 1 in equilibrium for all x0, as in the unilateral model of Section
3.
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remove the incumbent from o¢ ce when domestic spending is high and foreign
spending is low. Moreover, the equilibrium is pooling if Pr(gjxH ; xH) > 
for  = 1, and is hybrid otherwise. After some tedious manipulation, these
conditions reduce to a simple one, given in the following result.
Lemma 6 Suppose that s^ () > (1   )X. Then voters use yardstick com-
petition in equilibrium. A pooling equilibrium exists if and only if   1=2,
and a hybrid equilibrium exists if and only if  < 1=2.
To interpret this, recall that, in the absence of yardstick comparisons, the
equilibrium would have bad incumbents choosing xH when the state is  = L,
yielding a pooling equilibrium. Compared to this benchmark, the case of
yardstick competition deviates in three ways. First, a bad domestic incum-
bent may not be re-elected when he chooses xH , if the foreign incumbent
is good and gets a low cost draw. Second, a good domestic incumbent is
retained in o¢ ce when costs are high, and the foreign politician chooses
maximal rents. These changes to the voters strategy reect the clear-cut
information advantage from yardstick competition. Third, pooling may no
longer be optimal for incumbents when the foreign incumbent has a poor
initial reputation. To see this, observe that the likelihood ratio `(; ; ) is
decreasing in , as it depends on the voters assessment of the quality of the
incumbent in the other jurisdiction. Thus facing a foreign incumbent with
a low reputation makes it relatively less likely that the (xH ; xH) outcome is
generated by a good domestic incumbent, and hence that voters will re-elect
an incumbent who picks xH . The equilibrium now has the bad incumbent
reducing the probability that he chooses s^ in order to raise the signaling
value of the outcome xH . A foreign incumbent with a poor reputation inicts
a reputational externality on a domestic bad incumbent and reduces his in-
centive to pool with a good incumbent. Moreover, this aspect of yardstick
competition increases rent seeking.
Since improved information available through yardstick comparisons has
countervailing e¤ects on incentives and selection of politicians, its net impact
on voter welfare is unclear. The following result shows that the reputations
of politicians are key to understanding this.
Proposition 7 There exist parameters 0 < ~a < ~b < 1=2 such that voter
welfare is lower when yardstick comparisons are available than when they are
not if  < ~a, and the converse is true if  > ~b.
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This result emphasizes that voters who are better informed about the scal
environment may be worse o¤ in equilibrium, as bad politicians put less e¤ort
into building a reputation when they rst take o¢ ce. This insight explains
the above result. In some circumstances ( low), voters would be better o¤ if
they could commit to ignoring the scal performance in the other jurisdiction
in the course of a domestic election.
Yardstick competition is welfare decreasing when politiciansreputations
are poor because rents are increased with little advantage from the improved
information generated as most politicians who are kicked out are replaced by
an incumbent of the same type.
6 Concluding Remarks
A key issue in political economy concerns whether ideas from the Pigouvian
view of benevolent government are relevant when politics are introduced to
the model. One important dimension of this concerns whether government
is likely to act in the interests of the electorate. However, this cannot be re-
solved by assumption it depends on the way in which re-election incentives
work in holding government to account. We have set up a simple model that
nests two extreme views of government. The fact that government is imper-
fect gives a prima facie role for scal restraints. Whether scal restraints
are in fact desirable depends on the balance of selection and discipline e¤ects
in politics.
The model of elections used here is quite specic. However, it is a natural
framework to use in addressing these issues. Any failures in the political
process are due to limited information and incompleteness in contracts. It
remains to be seen how far the insights obtained here carry over to other
models of political resource allocation.16
Among the most surprising ndings is that certain kinds of scal restraint
are more likely to be a good idea for voters, the closer is politics to the
benevolent government ideal. However, this conclusion was shown to vary
by the type of restraint being considered. Thus, the analysis stresses the
need to think about each type of restraint on its merits. In moving forward,
the model has empirical implications tying together electoral accountability,
policy choices, and public nance.
16See Besley (2003), chapter one, for further discussion on this.
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The kind of piecemeal institutional analysis conducted here is a useful
way of addressing some policy issues. But the analysis does not address the
form of optimal scal constitutions. We take it as a binding constraint on
a democratic system that leaders must face periodic elections rather than
looking for optimal incentive contracts. Exploring the form of optimal con-
stitutions in a situation of limited information presents a challenging agenda
for future research.17
17For discussion in this direction, see La¤ont (2000).
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Appendix A: Proofs of Results
Proof of Lemma 1: Here we prove the ifpart of the lemma; the converse
can be veried by substitution. Suppose that (4) holds. Then s^+ X  X
for all   1, so that  = 0 is a best response. When  = 0, Pr(gjxH ; xH) = 1
and voters strictly prefer to re-elect the incumbent when spending is high.
This establishes part 3 of the result.
When q  1=2, then Pr(gjxH)   for all   1, implying  = 1 is a best
response for voters. When (4) does not hold, then  = 1 so that only a pooling
equilibrium exists. This establishes part 2. When q < 1=2, Pr(gjxH) < 
for  = 1 (so a pooling equilibrium cannot exist) but Pr(gjxH) =  when
 = q=(1 q) < 1. A strictly mixed strategy for type (b; L) is a best response
if and only if s^+ X = X, which establishes part 2. 
Proof of Proposition 1:
@EW
@
= q

(1 + ) + 
1  q
q
(1  )

@W g(H;)
@
(13)
+(1  q) [(1 + )  (1  )] @W
g(L; )
@
(14)
which is negative since @W g (; )=@ < 0 and   1. 
Proof of Proposition 2: The only two possible changes in equilibrium
strategy are from a pooling equilibrium to a separating equilibrium or from
a hybrid equilibrium to a separating equilibrium. As in the text dene  from
s
 


= (1  )X. From Proposition 1, we know that welfare is decreasing
locally along the path to : For  >  ; welfare will be at its full information
value. We now make use of the following result and its corollary.
Lemma 8 Expected welfare of voters is weakly greater in equilibrium when
unit cost  is unobserved than in the full information case if and only if
the discipline e¤ect outweighs the selection e¤ect, viz. if and only if D() 
S().
Proof of Lemma 8: When voters have full information about , the equi-
librium outcome is identical to that of the separating equilibrium. Using (5),
it is possible to calculate expected welfare for each of the three equilibrium
congurations. In the pooling equilibrium,
EW p = (1 + )EW 0 + (1  )(1  q)D() + (1  )qS() (15)
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while in the hybrid equilibrium,
EW h = (1 + )EW 0 + (1  )qD() + (1  )(1  q)S() (16)
and in the separating (or full-information) equilibrium,
EW s = (1 + )EW 0 + (1  )S() (17)
The change in equilibrium welfare due to imperfect information is therefore,
for the pooling equilibrium,
EW p   EW s = (1  )(1  q) [D()  S()] (18)
and, for the hybrid equilibrium,
EW h   EW s = (1  )q [D()  S()] (19)
Comparison of these expressions yields the result. 
We now prove the Proposition. Let  solve D = S and note S >
D > 0 implies  > 0 and  < 1 if  is su¢ ciently large. If  > , then the
improvement in information reinforces that in Proposition 1 and welfare must
be globally decreasing in . However, if   , then there is discontinuous
increase in welfare around : Thus in a neighborhood of , voter welfare is
increasing which justies the second claim. 
Proof of Proposition 3: Let  be the limit on government spending and
denote equilibrium welfare by EW (; ; ; ). Suppose that   xL. The
e¤ect of reducing the spending limit for any xed equilibrium strategies (; )
is
 @EW (; ; ; )
@
=   (1  )C 0 () [(1  q)  1 +  ( (q + (1  q) (1  ))  1)] > 0.
When equilibrium strategies change in response to a change in , voter
welfare changes discontinuously, with a move from separating to pooling
equilibrium as  becomes su¢ ciently small. Denote the critical value by
^ satisfying s^ () = (1  ) ^, and assume ^  xL. Dene ^ (^) from
D (^; ) = ^ (^)S (^; ) . Now observe that, provided that  < ^ (^),
welfare will be decreasing in  at the point of discontinuity ^ (using the ar-
gument of Lemma A3). Thus, for small enough , welfare is increasing in
the tax limitation  for any   xL. 
27
Proof of Lemma 2: A pooling equilibrium exists if and only if Pr(gjxH ; xH) 
 when  = 1 or, recalling (11), if and only if `(1; ; )  1. From the den-
itions of the conditional probabilities, this in turn holds if and only if
(1  )+ (1  )  (1  )(1  ) + 
which, since  > 1=2, simplies to   1=2.
It remains to be determined whether voters choose to re-elect the in-
cumbent when (x; x0) = (xH ; xL) or not. (Only in the latter case does an
equilibrium with yardstick competition exist.) At this information set, the
posterior probability the incumbent is the good type is
Pr(gjxH ; xL) = 
 + (1  )=(1  )
Hence Pr(gjxH ; xL) <  if and only if  > (1   )=. It is immediate this
holds in the pooling equilibrium (when   1=2) since  > 1=2. It can also
be established the inequality holds in the hybrid equilibrium (when  < 1=2).
To see this, observe that
`(; ; ) =
`

+

[Pr(xH ; xH jg)]2(1  )

2   (1  )2 > 0
since  > 1=2. Thus, since `(; ; ) = 1 and
`((1  )=; ; ) = 1
(1  ) + 2=(1  )2 < 1
for  > 1=2, we must have  > (1 )=. Hence voters remove the incumbent
from o¢ ce when (x; x0) = (xH ; xL) for all values of . 
Proof of Proposition 7: Analogous to (5), expected welfare of voters for
any equilibrium (; ) is given by:
EW (; ; ) = (1 + )EW 0 +
1  
2
D + (2   )S
where S > D > 0 are dened as before. In this expression, the second term
represents the discipline e¤ect of elections: with probability (1  )=2, the
incumbent is type (b; L) and chooses s1 = s^ instead of s1 = X. The third
term in the expression is the selection e¤ect of elections. Recall that the
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voter re-elects when x = xL (which occurs with probability =2) and re-
elects with probability  when (x; x0) = (xH ; xH). Further, the incumbent
is re-elected in state (xH ; X) if Pr(gjxH ; X) > . The challenger is elected
with complementary probability, in which case the posterior probability the
second-period incumbent is good is . Thus 2, the probability that a good
politician is in o¢ ce during the second period, satises
2 =

2
+

1  
2

 + (1  ) (Pr(xH ; xH jg)  Pr(xH ; xH jb))
+ (1  )maxfPr(xH ; Xjg)  Pr(xH ; Xjb); 0g
(20)
The conditional probabilities in state (xH ; xH) are dened in (10). Analo-
gously, the conditional probabilities of (xH ; X) are:
Pr(xH ; Xjg) = (1  )


2
+
1  
2
(1  )

Pr(xH ; Xjb) = (1  )


2
(1  )+ 1  
2


In the absence of yardstick information, the equilibrium is pooling ( = 1)
and the probability a good o¢ cial is in o¢ ce in the second period is
ny2 =  +
1
2
(1  )
whereas, in the equilibrium with yardstick competition, (20) simplies to
y2 = 
ny
2 + 
2(1  )

  1
2

y2 = 
ny
2 +
1
2
(1  )2maxf1  (2  )+ 2; 0g
if the equilibrium is hybrid. The di¤erence in equilibrium welfare in the two
cases is
 = EW y   EW ny = (  1)1  
2
D + (y2   ny2 )S
In the pooling equilibrium, which exists if   1=2,  = 1, so that  > 0. In
the hybrid equilibrium, we have  < 1 and y2  ny2 , so that the rst term
in the expression is negative and the second is non-negative. When  = 0,
however, y2 = 
ny
2 = 0, so that  < 0. Since  is continuous in , the result
follows. 
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